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POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING:                                              
WAS ELBRIDGE GERRY RIGHT? 
C. Daniel Chill* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In a process known as redistricting, electoral districts are 
reconfigured following each decennial census to account for 
population shifts since the previous census.1  While a variety of factors 
inform the placement of new district lines, partisan considerations, 
notably incumbency protection, loom large.  That the contours of 
electoral units are politically motivated is a matter of controversy. 
Partisan redistricting—and its concomitant objective of 
protecting incumbents—is assailed by good government                  
groups as undemocratic and fundamentally unfair. Good                                                      
government groups such as Common Cause,2 The League of Women                                                                             
 
   *     Professor of Law and Political Science, Touro College 
1 Such redistricting is required by the constitutional principle of one person/one vote 
announced by the United States Supreme Court in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) and 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
2 New York Common Cause, Comments by Common Cause/NY to the Senate Standing 
Committee On Election, (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.commoncause.org/policy-and- 
litigation/testimony/NY_101209_Comments_Election_Reform_Senate.pdf (“Common 
Cause/New York is a nonpartisan citizens’ lobby and a leading force in the battle for honest 
and accountable government.  Common Cause fights to strengthen public participation and 
faith in our institutions of self-government and to ensure that government and political 
processes serve the general interest, and not simply the special interests.”). “Can the Plan”: 
How the 2012 Redistricting Deal Denies New Yorkers Fair Representation and the 
Fundamentally Flawed Redistrcting “Reform”, NYPIRG (June 2014), 
http://www.nypirg.org/pubs/goodgov/2014.06.23Redistricting-CanthePlan/cantheplan.pdf.  
“Consonant with our overall mission we have consistently worked . . . to improve 
accessibility, accuracy, transparency, and verifiability in our democratic process at the city, 
state and national level.” Testimony of Susan Lerner Executive Director, Common Cause/NY 
Before the New York City Council Committees on Civil Rights and on Immigration Regarding 
Joing Public Hearing on Census Issues, N.Y. COMMON CAUSE (Nov. 20, 2009), 
http://www.commoncause.org/policyandlitigation/testimony/NY_112009_SusanLerner_Test
imony.pdf.  
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Voters,3 New York PIRG,4 and The Brennan Center,5 as well as 
newspapers as diverse as The New York Times,6 and Milwaukee 
Wisconsin Journal Sentinel7 have engaged in a crusade against partisan 
redistricting.  Joining these advocates of restraints on partisan political 
line drawing are a plethora of academicians both legal and non-legal.  
Critics maintain that the Holy Grail of effective government is 
legislative turnover, achieved either by eliminating lengthy terms for 
legislators (term limits)8 and/or through non-partisan drawing of 
legislative districts. 
This author maintains that despite its derision by academicians 
and good government groups, partisan redistricting aimed at protecting 
incumbents not only is not pernicious, but in fact, results in a preferred 
legislative product.  As will be shown, this counterintuitive conclusion 
is impelled by considered judicial authority as well as a measure of 
reasoned scholarly analysis. 
Part II provides an overview of the debate over the role of 
political partisanship in the district drawing process.  Part III discusses 
the jurisprudence of redistricting protective of incumbents.  Part IV 
 
3 At a public hearing before the New York State Legislative Task Force on Demographic 
Research and Reapportionment (“LATFOR”), representatives of The League of Women 
Voters testified as follows: “The League is a non-partisan organization which encourages 
informed and active involvement in government and influences public policy through 
education and advocacy . . . . The public wants an independent commission – not LATFOR – 
to draw state legislative and congressional district boundaries . . . . “ Testimony Before the 
Legislative Task Force on Demographic Research and Reapportionment, LMV: THE LEAGUE 
OF WOMEN VOTERS OF N.Y. ST. (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.lwvny.org/advocacy/gov-
reform/redistricting/2011/Testimony-LATFOR080411.pdf. 
4 The New York Public Interest Research Group (“NYPIRG”) is a New York State-wide 
student-directed, non-partisan, not-for-profit political organization and NYPIRG advocates 
the creation of an independent redistricting commission, ensuring that legislative districts are 
drawn to best represent New Yorkers, rather than improve a legislator’s chances at reelection. 
About NYPIRG, NYPIRG, http://www.nypirg.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2017). 
5 The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law is a non-partisan 
public policy and law institute that focuses on fundamental issues of democracy and justice 
and is a “leader in the fight for just and equitable redistricting procedures . . . . “ Justin Levitt, 
A Citizen’s Guide to Redistricting, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (2010), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/CGR%20Reprint%20Single%20Pag
e.pdf. 
6 See Sam Wang, The Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of-2012.html. 
7 See End Partisan Redistricting in Wisconsin, MILWAUKEE WIS. J.  SENTINEL (Feb. 6, 
2014), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/opinion/end-partisan-redistricting-in-wisconsin-
b99199581z1-244106841.html. 
8 Robert Kurfirst, Term-Limit Logic: Paradigms and Paradoxes, 29 POLITY 119, 126 
(1996).  
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explores the overlap between politically and racially based district 
drawing.  Finally, Part V examines the various restraints on 
incumbency protection currently employed by the states. 
II. PARTISAN POLITICAL REDISTRICTING: THE DEBATE 
Most political scientists and many legal scholars decry partisan 
political gerrymandering as violative of democratic principles of fair 
political competition.  Partisan political gerrymandering is claimed, 
ipso facto, to result in an uneven electoral playing field.  It therefore is 
anathema to many in the political science community who view such 
partisan advantage as a dagger in the heart of the body politic.  Daniel 
D. Polsby, Professor of Law at Northwestern University and Robert D. 
Popper, a practicing lawyer, attack partisan political gerrymandering 
as antithetical to core precepts of democracy.9  They contend that 
“gerrymandering inflicts harm on democratic institutions . . . [and] 
violates the American constitutional tradition by conceding to 
legislatures a power of self-selection.”10 Self-constitutive legislatures, 
or self-constitutive governing institutions of any kind, make no sense 
under a Constitution whose most arresting innovation was the 
dispersion of power:11 “Gerrymandering introduces a chronic, self-
perpetuating skew into the business of popular representation, no 
matter how the term is defined.”12  Martin Shapiro, Professor of Law 
(Emeritus) at University of California Berkeley School of Law, 
denounces partisan gerrymandering as a “pathology of democracy” 
and further stated that “[g]errymandering is a bad, bad thing.”13 
The late Yale University Professor Robert A. Dahl defined “a 
key characteristic of democracy [as] the continuing responsiveness of 
the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as 
political equals” with unimpaired opportunities.14  Dahl further 
elucidates, “the rights of citizenship include the opportunity to oppose 
and vote out the highest officials in the government.”15 
 
9 Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural 
Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 302 (1991).  
10 Id. at 304. 
11 Id. at 304. 
12 Id. at 305. 
13 Martin Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L. REV. 
227, 239, 251 (1985). 
14 ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971). 
15 ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 220 (1989). 
3
Chill: Political Gerrymandering
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
798 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
Drawing on this concept, Jennifer Clark, Assistant Professor of 
Political Science at The University of Houston, argues: 
The redistricting process has important consequences 
for voters.  In some states, incumbent legislators work 
together to protect their own seats, which produces less 
competition in the political system . . . . Voters may feel 
as though they do not have a meaningful alternative to 
the incumbent legislator.  Legislators who lack 
competition in their districts have less incentive to 
adhere to their constituents’ opinions.16 
Andrew Gelman, Professor of Political Science at University of 
California, Berkeley, and Gary King, Professor of Political Science at 
Harvard University maintain that optimal partisan redistricting plans 
produce a less responsive electoral system.17 
Notwithstanding the distaste of these scholars and their ilk for 
partisan political gerrymandering, a viable solution is elusive.  Bruce 
E. Cain, Professor of Political Science, University of California, 
Berkeley, concedes that the problems caused by the unfairness of 
partisan gerrymandering remain unresolved and that solutions offered 
by legal scholars and political science professors are either unworkable 
or undoable.18 
Others, however, do not think the problem insuperable.  Led by 
Professor Richard Pildes of the University of Michigan Law School, 
Professor Samuel Issacharoff of New York University Law School and 
Professor Pamela Karlan of Stanford Law School, these academicians 
 
16 Aaron Manuel, Redistricting Will Affect November Election, THE DAILY COUGAR, (Oct. 
16, 2012), http://thedailycougar.com/2012/10/16/redistricting-will-affect-november-election/ 
(quotations omitted). 
17 Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 
88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 543 (1994); see also Guillermo Owen & Bernard Grofman, 
Optimal Partisan Gerrymandering, 7 POL. GEOGRAPHY Q. 5, 12, 19 (1988). 
18 For a review of Professor Cain’s criticisms of proposed solutions, see Bruce E. Cain, 
Garrett’s Temptation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1589, 1589 (1999); Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting 
Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808, 1812-13 (2012) [hereinafter 
Buffer]; BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS, AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM 
QUANDARY 120, 122 (2015).  Countermeasures to the perceived evil of partisan redistricting 
have taken the form of non-partisan drawing of districts by independent commissions and/or 
term limits.  Term limits, which were popular in the decade of the 1990s, attack incumbency 
by limiting the number of terms a legislator may legally serve.  Non-partisan redistricting, 
which was the focus of the 2000’s redistricting laws, addresses the form and process of 
constructing legislative districts, irrespective of the candidate.  The latter measure places the 
emphasis on the districts, not on the candidate.  These are discussed in detail, see infra Part 
IV. 
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 3, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/9
2017 POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING 799 
advocate attacking partisan political gerrymandering by engaging the 
legal system to assure an appropriate and competitive political 
environment without artificial barriers to robust political competition 
such as gerrymandering.19  Professor Issacharoff argues that: 
So long as the [redistricting] process is left in the hands 
of incumbent political officials whose self-interest runs 
strongly to what they can get away with, and so long as 
judicial oversight remains cumbersome and 
unpredictable, the private interest will likely continue 
to subsume the public interest.  A strategy of 
reinforcing political competition by taking the process 
of redistricting out of the hands of partisan officials 
offers the prospect of realizing our constitutional 
values.20 
A powerful rebuttal was not long in coming.  In replying to 
Issacharoff’s proposal to delegitimize districts drawn by self-interested 
decision makers, Professor Nathaniel Persily,  James B. McClatchy 
Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, “disagree[s] fundamentally 
. . . with almost every aspect of Issacharoff’s argument.”21  Persily 
articulates four principal points of disagreement.  First, Professor 
Persily disagrees with Issacharoff’s definition and assessment of the 
problem he wishes to solve: “By focusing on incumbent reelection 
rates and margins of victory, Issacharoff ignores evidence both of 
intense competition for control of legislatures and of remarkable levels 
of legislative turnover.”22  Second, Persily maintains that “to the extent 
incumbents have unfair and growing advantages over challengers, 
redistricting is not to blame.”23  Third, he argues that “the creation of 
safe seats, the principal target of Issacharoff’s ire, is neither inherently 
undesirable nor easily avoidable.”24  Fourth, “the alternative that 
 
19 See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan 
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); see also SAMUEL 
ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 822 (3d ed. 2007); see also Samuel Issacharoff, 
Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1650 (1993). 
20 Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 647-
48 (2002) (footnote omitted). 
21 Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial 
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymandering, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 650 (2002). 
22 Id. at 650. 
23 Id. at 650. 
24 Id. at 650. 
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Issacharoff would have the courts force upon state governments,” 
namely, “redistricting by politically insulated commissions” is “both 
undesirable in theory and difficult to create in fact.” 25  Persily claims 
that “there is good reason to consider safe districts preferable from the 
standpoint of democratic theory.”26 
As a preliminary matter, Persily notes that notwithstanding and 
in spite of partisan gerrymandering, there constantly have been 
significant degrees of legislative turnover, as the  1992 Congressional 
elections illustrate.27  The 1992 Congressional election occurred on the 
heels of the 1990’s incumbent protective redistricting.28  Yet, more 
than one quarter of the U.S. House of Representatives were elected for 
the first time.29  Persily recounts that from 1972 through 2002, 10% to 
20% of the seat holders in the House of Representatives changed with 
each election and that turnover was even greater at the state legislative 
level.30 
Next, Persily disputes the cause and effect relationship between 
partisan redistricting and low legislative turnover.  He posits that the 
argument that gerrymandering of individual legislative districts results 
in unacceptable incumbent reelection rates is belied by the fact that 
“statewide elections unaffected by redistricting, such as elections for 
governor and U.S. Senate, have shown parallel growth in rates of 
incumbent reelection.”31  Further, Persily does not agree that from the 
standpoint of the electorate, low turnover translates into poor 
representation.  He observes that because Congress accords great 
influence to representatives based on seniority, it is governmentally 
beneficial to keep incumbents in office as long as possible to enhance 
the seniority, and thus the influence, of a stated congressional 
delegate.32  Similarly, he argues that states have a legitimate interest 
“in keeping experienced legislators in state government.” 33 
Finally, Persily describes the practical difficulties of replacing 
the present system with one that is purely non-partisan.34  Obviously, 
 
25 Id. at 650. 
26 Persily, supra note 21, at 650. 
27 Persily, supra note 21, at 654. 
28 Persily, supra note 21, at 657. 
29 Persily, supra note 21, at 654. 
30 Persily, supra note 21, at 654. 
31 Persily, supra note 21, at 650. 
32 Persily, supra note 21, at 650. 
33 Persily, supra note 21, at 650. 
34 Persily, supra note 21, at 674, 676-77. 
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even members of so-called non-partisan commissions have political 
biases.35  Neither they, nor the people who choose them, are politically 
immaculately conceived.  Unlike formless space aliens, appointees to 
so-called independent districting commissions do not spring forth 
without any intention or form.  As human beings, these appointees 
bring to the table their own internal political predilections, experiences 
and prejudices.  And, the institutions and government officials who 
appoint such commissioners similarly start with their own set of 
political prejudices (i.e., Democrats, Republicans, Socialists, rich, 
poor, et al.).36  Persily proved to be prescient.37 
Persily is not a lone scholarly voice positing the notion that 
partisan political redistricting is not necessarily a governmental evil as 
Issacharoff and his fellow scholars assert.  Stephen Ansolabehere, 
Professor of Government at Harvard University, and James M. Snyder, 
Jr., Professor of History and Political Science at Harvard University, 
conclude in a recent article that, in fact, redistricting actually weakens 
the incumbent advantage and helps promote turnover.38 
Professors Ansolabehere and Snyder undertook an empirical 
study of five factors indicative of the impact of political control over 
the districting process.39  Their analysis shows that political 
redistricting does not necessarily result in incumbent advantage.40  
First, they found that while the expectation for protection of 
incumbents would dictate that districts be either overwhelmingly 
Democratic or overwhelmingly Republican, statistical analysis reveals 
that most districts are moderate, with little heavy skewing in favor of 
one party or the other.41  Second, because redistricting inevitably 
 
35 Persily, supra note 21, at 659. 
36 A challenge to the creation of an Arizona State Redistricting Commission was decided 
by the U.S. Supreme Court. Arizona State Legislative v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting 
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).  Even Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who 
authored the majority opinion upholding Arizona’s delegation of redistricting responsibility 
to the Commission, recognized that non-partisan redistricting is not an electoral panacea 
because it hasn’t eliminated the inevitable partisan suspicions associated with political line 
drawing.  She invoked Berkeley’s Professor Cain in support of this proposition. Id. at 2676. 
37 See Harris v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016) (exploring a 
fuller discussion on how political considerations infected the claimed non-partisan Arizona 
Redistricting Commission). 
38 See Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., The Effects of Redistricting on 
Incumbents, 11 ELECTION L.J.: RULES, POL., & POL’Y 490 (2012), 
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/11910880/19401494.pdf?sequence=1.  
39 Id. at 4.  
40 Id. at 4.  
41 Id. at 4, 8-9.  
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results in changes to district boundary lines, with an attendant 
replacement of constituents whom the representative has served with 
new, unfamiliar voters, it is unhelpful to incumbents.42  Third, with 
respect to districted offices, such as the state legislatures and the U.S. 
House of Representatives, the vote share when an incumbent is 
running versus the vote share when an incumbent is not running is 
“much smaller” than the vote share of incumbents running for non-
districted offices, such as governor or U.S. Senate.43  Fourth, statistics 
reveal only small changes in district partisanship.  Lastly, turnover was 
found to be highest in redistricting years.44  (If redistricting was in fact 
co-extensive with incumbency protection the opposite would occur.) 
Partisan political gerrymandering has also had other, earlier 
scholarly defenders.  Peter H. Schuck, Professor Emeritus of Law at 
Yale School, has suggested that partisan gerrymandering in some of its 
aspects could actually benefit democracy because it “reinforce[s] the 
majority party’s capacity to govern alone, making it easier to attribute 
responsibility for political acts,” and thus furthers the goal of party 
accountability.45  Professors Andrew Gelman and Gary King observe 
that: 
The political turmoil created by legislative redistricting 
creates political renewal.  Many of the goals sought by 
proponents of term limitations are solved by legislative 
redistricting.  Even the reputation of the “egregious” 
partisan gerrymander has been somewhat rehabilitated: 
not only does redistricting perform the simple task of 
getting the numbers right, but redistricting has tended 
to reduce partisan bias and increase electoral 
responsiveness.46   
In 2006, Emory University professors Alan Abramowitz, Brad 
Alexander and Matthew Gunning wrote, “some studies have 
concluded that redistricting has a neutral or positive effect on 
competition . . . . [I]t is often the case that partisan redistricting has the 
 
42 Id.at 13-14.  
43 Ansolabehere & Snyder, Jr., supra note 38, at 4-5.  
44 Ansolabehere & Snyder, Jr., supra note 38, at 5.  
45 Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and the Judicial 
Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1361 (1987). 
46 Gelman & King, supra note 17, at 554. 
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effect of reducing the safety of incumbents, thereby making elections 
more competitive.”47 
Persily wrote his rebuttal to Issacharoff in 2002.  A review of 
election results following the most recent spate of incumbency 
protection statutes, passed after the 2010 census, buttresses Persily’s 
argument that despite partisan gerrymandering both the House of 
Representatives and state legislatures continue to experience 
significant legislative turnover.  In 2014, an average of 23% of 
legislative seats in state senates turned over.  In 2014, an average of 
21.1% of house seats turned over.  Even in large states such as 
California, 25% of the senate seats turned over and 47.5% of the house 
seats turned over.48  In 2012, 65 members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives did not return, a turnover rate of 15%.49 
The turnover rate would seem antithetical to the claim that 
partisan gerrymandering is a major political device for incumbency 
protection. 
III. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE LEGITIMACY OF 
INCUMBENCY PROTECTION IN REDISTRICTING      
Under the U.S. Constitution, legislative districts must be 
redrawn after every decennial census to ensure voting equality by 
complying with the Constitutional mandate of one person, one vote.50  
Any redistricting plan must also safeguard the voting rights of minority 
groups,51 pursuant to the requirements of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and of Sections 2 and 5 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.52  Case law at all levels validates 
incumbency protection as a legitimate state redistricting policy. 
 
47 Alan I. Abramowitz et al., Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in 
the U.S. House Elections, 68 J. POL.75, 76 (2006) (citation omitted). 
48 2014 Post-Election State Legislative Seat Turnover, NCSL: NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/2014-
post-election-turnover.aspx. 
49 House Incumbents Retired, Defeated, or Reelected, 1946-2014, BROOKINGS 13 (2014), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/vitalstats_ch2_full.pdf.  
50 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583-84; Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 8-9. 
51 White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973). 
52 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301 (2014). , 
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A. U.S. Supreme Court Authority 
In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has recognized the 
legitimacy of incumbency protection as a factor in legislative 
redistricting.  That incumbency protection is a valid state policy to be 
taken into account in crafting a redistricting plan that flows from the 
oft cited Supreme Court admonition that “[p]olitics and political 
considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment.”53  
As the Supreme Court recognizes “redistricting in most cases will 
implicate a political calculus,” the courts must accordingly “be 
sensitive to the complex interplay of forces that enter a legislature’s 
redistricting calculus.”54 
In White v. Weiser, the Supreme Court recognized as a 
legitimate redistricting goal a state policy aimed at maintaining 
existing relationships between incumbent representatives and their 
constituents, and preserving the seniority of the state’s congressional 
delegation.55 
  In Karcher v. Daggett, the Supreme Court held that 
“preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between 
incumbent Representatives” is a valid state redistricting policy.56  
 In Abrams v. Johnson, the Supreme Court held that Georgia’s 
interest in “maintaining core districts and communities of interest” 
justified certain deviations in population in a plan drawn by the district 
court.57  
 In Bush v. Vera, the Supreme Court flatly stated: “[W]e have 
recognized incumbency protection, at least in the limited form of 
‘avoiding contests between incumbents,’ as a legitimate state goal . . . . 
[L]egitimate districting considerations, including incumbency, can be 
sustained.”58 
In Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, the Supreme Court, in 
a plurality opinion, recognized “incumbency protection” as a 
“customary districting concern.”59  See generally Houston Lawyers 
Ass’n v. Attorney General of Texas, recognizing legitimacy of state’s 
 
53 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973). 
54 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 914-16 (1995). 
55 412 U.S. 783, 791 (1973). 
56 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983) (emphasis added).  
57 521 U.S. 74, 76 (1997). 
58 517 U.S. 952, 964-65(1996) (emphasis added) (citing Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740; White, 
412 U.S. at 797; Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n.16 (1966). 
59 528 U.S. 320, 346 (2000). 
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interest in “maintaining” an existing electoral system to preserve the 
“link” between an elected official and the official’s base.60 
The Supreme Court has declined to strike down politically 
motivated redistricting plans, even in cases where the evidence of 
partisanship was overwhelming.61  As recently as 2015, in Alabama 
Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama,62 the Supreme Court listed with 
approval incumbency protection as a valid race-neutral redistricting 
principle.63 
B. Lower Federal Court Authority: New York State 
In Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc. v. Gantt, 
the court acknowledged that the redistricting criteria that properly may 
be considered include “maintenance of the cores of existing districts, 
communities of interest, and political fairness.”64 
In Diaz v. Silver, the court found that the “legislators[‘] . . . 
quite legitimate concerns about the ability of representatives to 
maintain relationships they had already developed with their 
constituents,” as well as “the powerful role that seniority plays in the 
 
60 Houston Lawyers Ass’n v. Att’y General of Texas, 501 U.S. 419, 426 (1991). 
61 Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999) (citing Bush, 517 U.S. at 968); Shaw v. 
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996); Miller, 515 U.S. at 916; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 
(1993); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion) (upholding a 
Pennsylvania congressional redistricting plan that was challenged as a pro-Republican 
gerrymander); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (upholding an Indiana legislature plan 
alleged to be a partisan gerrymander); Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 752 (upholding a Connecticut 
legislature plan alleged to be a bipartisan gerrymander). 
62 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1270 (2015). 
63 By contrast, often in dissent, Justice Stevens has consistently held that partisan 
gerrymandering is justiciable and unconstitutional. See Vieth, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) where 
Justice Stevens stated in dissent:  
Today’s plurality opinion would exempt governing officials from that 
duty in the context of legislative redistricting and would give license,       
for the first time, to partisan gerrymanders that are devoid of any rational 
justification.  In my view, when partisanship is the legislature’s sole 
motivation – when any pretense of neutrality is forsaken unabashedly and 
all traditional districting criteria are subverted for partisan advantage – the 
governing body cannot be said to have acted impartially. 
Id. at 318 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens also argued that the Constitution should be 
amended to prohibit political gerrymandering. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, Political 
Gerrymandering, in SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE 
CONSTITUTION 33-55 (2014).  
64 796 F. Supp. 681, 691 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (emphasis added). 
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functioning of Congress make[ ] incumbency an important and 
legitimate factor for a legislature to consider.”65 
The two decisions in Rodriguez v. Pataki,66 involving New 
York’s redistricting in the wake of the 2000 census, further illuminate 
the validity of incumbency protection. 
C. The Rodriguez Court Drawn Congressional Plan 
After the 2000 decennial census, the New York State 
Legislature initially failed to draw new congressional district lines for 
use in the 2002 election.67 A three-judge court was empaneled for 
drawing a court ordered redistricting plan for New York’s 
congressional delegation.  The court appointed former U.S. District 
Judge Frederick B. Lacey Special Master to prepare and recommend 
to the court a proposed congressional redistricting plan.68  On May 13, 
2002, the Special Master filed his report with the court.69  In that May 
13, 2002 report, the Special Master acknowledged incumbency as a 
factor when he specifically rejected proposed plans that paired 
incumbents.70  The court, in adopting the Special Master’s plan “in its 
entirety,” inter alia, noted with approval, the plan’s respect for “ ‘the 
cores of current districts and the communities of interest that have 
formed around them,’ “71 which resulted in the separation of two 
incumbents in Manhattan (Congresspersons Nadler and Maloney) so 
they would not have to run against each other.72 
1. Challenge in the Rodriguez Case to Legislatively 
Enacted Congressional, State, Senate and 
Assembly Lines 
 
 
65 978 F. Supp. 96, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
66 Rodriguez v. Pataki, No. 02 Civ. 618 (RMB), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9272, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2002) [hereinafter Rodriguez I]; Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) [hereinafter Rodriguez II]. 
67 Rodriguez II, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 354-55.  
68 Order Appointing Special Master, Rodriguez v. Pataki, 207 F. Supp. 2d 123 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
69 Rodriguez I, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9272, at *2-3. 
70 Rodriguez v. Pataki, No. 02 Civ. 0618, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11782, at *63 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 13, 2002). 
71 Rodriguez I, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9272, at *2, *20. 
72 Id. at *20-21. 
12
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The Rodriguez plaintiffs, who included African-American, 
Hispanic, and Caucasian New York voters, asserted a further claim 
against Governor Pataki and other state officials (before the same 
three-judge federal court) seeking to overturn the congressional and 
legislative lines adopted by the state legislature following Rodriguez 
I.73  After a lengthy trial, the court, on March 15, 2004, handed down 
a 211 page decision (“Rodriguez II”) dismissing all claims against the 
legislatively enacted Congressional, Senate and Assembly district 
lines.74 
One of the grounds constituting the basis for the challenge in 
Rodriguez II was the claim of partisan gerrymandering, which the 
court rejected, noting that “‘preserving the cores of prior districts,’” 
and “‘avoiding contests between incumbent Representatives’” are 
“‘important state policies’” in redistricting.75 
Another ground on which the Rodriguez II challenge rested 
was the population deviation among the legislative districts.  As to that 
claim, the Rodriguez court: 
[D]enied the defendants’ initial motion to dismiss . . . 
the Complaint, . . . to give the plaintiffs an opportunity 
to meet their burden to show that the minimal deviation 
results solely from an unconstitutional or irrational state 
purpose rather than from other state policies recognized 
by the Supreme Court to be appropriate reasons for 
deviations.  Such policies, announced in Karcher, 
include “making districts compact, respecting 
municipal boundaries, preserving the cores of prior 
districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent 
representatives.”76 
In finding that the population deviation in the plan at issue was justified 
by, inter alia, the need to protect incumbents, the court held: “The plan 
promotes the traditional principles of maintaining the core of districts 
and limiting incumbent pairing.”77 
 
73 Rodriguez II, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 351. 
74 Id. at 351-52. 
75 Id. at 363, 366 (quoting Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740)  
76 Rodriguez II, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 366 (quoting Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740) (emphasis 
added). 
77 Rodriguez II, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 370 (emphasis omitted). 
13
Chill: Political Gerrymandering
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
808 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
Finally, the Rodriguez II court specifically endorsed that part 
of the state senate plan drawn to “avoid[ ] [a] partisan reconfiguration 
against [incumbent] Sen[ator] Velella . . . . “ 78 
D. Lower Federal Court Authority: States Other Than 
New York 
In South Carolina State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. 
Riley, the court stated the following about incumbency protection 
embodied in the plan it drew: 
Any new plan should alter the old only insofar as 
necessary to obtain an acceptable result.  Incumbents 
know their constituents in the old districts, and many of 
those constituents will know their congressman as “my 
congressman.”  Many of the constituents would have 
been served by the congressman in ways calculated to 
obtain and enhance loyal support.  Such voters ought 
not to be deprived of the opportunity to vote for a 
candidate that has served them well in the past and to 
enjoy his continued representation of them.  Supporters 
and opponents, alike, have a basis for judging him.79 
In Arizonans for Fair Representation v. Symington, the court 
found: 
The court [plan] also should avoid unnecessary or 
invidious outdistricting of incumbents. Unless 
outdistricting is required by the Constitution or the 
Voting Rights Act, the maintenance of incumbents 
provides the electorate with some continuity.  The 
voting population within a particular district is able to 
maintain its relationship with its particular 
representative and avoids accusations of political 
gerrymandering.80 
 
78 Id. at 459. 
79 533 F. Supp. 1178, 1180-81 (D.S.C.) (per curiam), aff’d sub nom. Stevenson v. South 
Carolina State Conference of Branches of NAACP, Inc., 459 U.S. 1025 (1982). 
80 828 F. Supp. 684, 688 (D. Ariz. 1992), aff’d sub nom. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce 
v. Arizonans for Fair Representation, 507 U.S. 981 (1993) (citation omitted). 
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In Prosser v. Elections Board, the court drawn plan lacked 
incumbent pairings thereby creating the least “perturbation in the 
political balance of the state.”81 
In Colleton County Council v. McConnell, the court, in 
articulating the traditional redistricting principles that guided the court-
drawn plan, stated that “[m]aintaining the residences of the 
incumbents” to protect “the core constituency’s interest in reelecting, 
if they choose, an incumbent representative in whom they have placed 
their trust,” was a “worthy” redistricting consideration.82 
In Smith v. Clark, the court included “protection of incumbent 
residences” as a factor to be considered in drawing of court-ordered 
plan because “maintenance of incumbents provides the electorate with 
some continuity.”83  In discussing its plan, the court acknowledged its 
design to protect incumbents.84 
In short, judicial approval for legislatively enacted districts 
designed to effect incumbency protection is overwhelming throughout 
the United States court system.  In any event, although the Supreme 
Court in Davis v. Bandemer,85 held claims of partisan gerrymandering 
to be technically justiciable,86 in Vieth v. Jubelirer,87 and League of 
United Latin American Citizens v. Perry,88 the Supreme Court decided 
that because a manageable standard for determining excessive 
partisanship could not be found, court intervention in political 
gerrymandering cases would be improper.89 
 
81 793 F. Supp. 859, 871 (W.D. Wis. 1992). 
82 201 F. Supp. 2d 618, 647 (D.S.C. 2002). 
83 189 F. Supp. 2d 529, 541, 545 (S.D. Miss. 2002) 
84 Id. at 545. 
85 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
86 Id. at 143.  
87 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281.  
88 548 U.S. 399, 413-14, 423 (2006). 
89  For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of Davis v. Bandemer and Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, see Jeanne C. Fromer, An Exercise in Line-Drawing: Deriving & 
Measuring Fairness in Redistricting, 93 GEO. L.J. 1547, 1564-66 (2005); however, 
see Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421-bbc, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160811, at *3 (D. 
Wis. Nov. 21, 2016) (holding that the Wisconsin Legislature’s 2011 redrawing of 
State Assembly districts to favor Republicans was an unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymander, the first such ruling in three decades of pitched legal battles over the 
issue).  On June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gill v. Whitford.  
The court set forth the following issues: (1) whether the district court violated Vieth 
v. Jubelirer when it held that it had the authority to entertain a statewide challenge 
to Wisconsin’s redistricting plan, instead of requiring a district-by-district analysis; 
15
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IV.  PARTISANSHIP AND RACE BASED REDISTRICTING 
In 1965, the United States Congress passed The Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, which was signed into law by President Lyndon B. 
Johnson.90 
The Act provides nationwide voting protections for minority 
voters.  Section 2 of the Act is a provision that prohibits every state 
and local government from imposing any voting law that results in 
discrimination against racial or language minorities.91  Other general 
 
(2) whether the district court violated Vieth when it held that Wisconsin’s 
redistricting plan was an impermissible partisan gerrymander, even though it was 
undisputed that the plan complies with traditional redistricting principles; (3) 
whether the district court violated Vieth by adopting a watered-down version of the 
partisan-gerrymandering test employed by the plurality in Davis v. Bandemer; (4) 
whether the defendants are entitled, at a minimum, to present additional evidence 
showing that they would have prevailed under the district court’s test, which the court 
announced only after the record had closed; and (5) whether partisan-gerrymandering 
claims are justiciable.  On June 19, 2017, the court in a 5-4 decision granted a stay 
of the lower court decision pending disposition of the appeal in the Supreme Court.  
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/todays-orders-court-tackle-partisan-
gerrymandering/; Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161 (S. Ct. June 19, 2017). 
 
90 Voting Rights Act, supra note 52.  The Act was later amended five times to expand its 
protections. Voting Rights Act, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/voting-
rights-act (last visited Apr. 28, 2017). 
91 The Voting Rights Act provides: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, 
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political 
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the 
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, 
or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of 
this title, as provided in subsection (b). 
 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to 
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally 
open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by 
subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice.  The extent to which members of a 
protected class have been elected to office in the State or political 
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered:  Provided, 
[t]hat nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a 
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the 
population. 
Voting Rights Act, supra note 52. 
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provisions specifically outlaw literacy tests and similar devises that 
historically were used to disenfranchise racial minorities. 
Another important provision of the Act is the Section 5 
preclearance requirement, which prohibits certain jurisdictions from 
implementing any change affecting voting without receiving 
preapproval from either the U.S. Attorney General or the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia that the voting change does not 
derogate protected minorities.92  Section 5 applies to jurisdictions 
encompassed by the “coverage formula” prescribed in Section 4(b).93  
The coverage formula was originally designed to embrace jurisdictions 
that engaged in egregious voting discrimination in 1965.94  The 
constitutionality of the Act was upheld in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach.95  However, in Shelby County v. Holder, the U.S. 
Supreme Court struck down the coverage formula as unconstitutional, 
reasoning that it was no longer responsive to current conditions.96  The 
Court did not strike down Section 5, but without a coverage formula, 
Section 5 is toothless.97 
The essence of Section 2 of the Act requires that districts be 
drawn in a manner that preserves the ability of minorities to elect 
preferred candidates of their choice.98  The Act specifically addressed 
two separate methods of disenfranchising minorities, cracking and 
packing.  Cracking was a method used to disenfranchise minorities by 
dividing minority population concentrations into two separate districts, 
which prevented minorities from constituting a majority in either 
district.99  Packing involved cramming so many minority voters into 
one district so it reduces their voting strength in surrounding 
districts.100  Since concentration and/or dispersal of protected 
minorities are impermissible, race conscious redistricting is required 
in order to avoid running afoul of the Act. 
 
92 52 U.S.C.A. § 10304(a) (2006).  
93 52 U.S.C.A. § 10303(b) (2006). 
94 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013). 
95 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966). 
96 Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2629.  
97 Id. at 2622. 
98 Id. at 2621. 
99 See David Lublin, Race & Redistricting in the United States: An Overview, in 
REDISTRICTING IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 141, 144 (Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman 
eds., 2008) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE].  
100 Id.   
17
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In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court held that a Section 
2 violation may occur by reason of the failure to construct an 
appropriate district for a protected minority where plaintiffs can 
establish three preconditions: “the minority group must be” 
(a) ”sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a 
majority in a single-member district;” (b) ”politically cohesive;” and 
(c) usually unable to elect its preferred candidate due to white-bloc 
voting.101  Accordingly, the existence of those circumstances may 
require that a redistricting plan create corresponding majority minority 
districts.102 
Since minorities vote overwhelmingly for Democrats, districts 
in which they are placed will have a partisan slant as the extent to 
which a district comprises minority populations will have a substantial 
effect on whether the district elects a Democratic legislator or a 
Republican legislator.  Accordingly, there is inevitably a political 
calculus in drawing Voting Rights districts for protected minorities, 
albeit under the rubric of racial redistricting considerations.103 
The Supreme Court in Harris v. Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission vividly illustrates this point.104  In 2014, 
Arizona voters brought a lawsuit contending that the Arizona so-called 
non-partisan Independent Redistricting Commission violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution in drawing Arizona 
legislative lines that favor Democrats.105  The complaint, inter alia, 
claimed that gaining partisan advantage for one political party by 
systemically overpopulating sixteen Republican districts while under 
populating eleven Democratic districts so as to favor Democrats is not 
a legislative function sufficient to justify deviation from the 
constitutional one-person, one-vote prerogative.106 
 
101 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). 
102 See Lublin, supra note 99, at 144; Bartlett v. Strickland, 566 U.S. 1, 26-27 (2009) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (confirming that only communities that can form over 50% of a 
district’s relevant population have viable Section 2 claims). 
103 See Thomas Brunell & Bernard Grofman, The Partisan Consequences of Baker v. Carr 
and the One Person, One Vote Revolution, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 99, 225, 
227-29, 232-33.  On December 5, 2016, the Supreme Court heard Oral Arguments for 
Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017) and McCrory v. Harris, 
137 S. Ct. 458 (2016).  
104 Harris, 136 S. Ct. 1301. 
105 Id. at 1307 
106 Harris v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050 (D. Ariz. 
2014). 
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The three-judge district court found the commission 
malapportioned Arizona’s legislature for two reasons: (1) the desire to 
give the Democratic party a political advantage; and (2) because the 
commission’s lawyer and consultant said that the Justice Department 
would not preclear the reapportionment scheme under Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act unless the commission underpopulated eleven 
districts to create (or to attempt to create) minority “ability-to-elect” 
districts.107  Two of the three district judges upheld the commission’s 
unequal reapportionment plan on the ground that the Justice 
Department required unequally populated districts to obtain 
preclearance under the Voting Rights Act, even though they 
recognized that there was some partisanship involved.108  Relying on 
the district court’s finding that the “population deviations were 
primarily a result of good-faith efforts to comply with the Voting 
Rights Act,” the Supreme Court upheld the redistricting plan, 
notwithstanding that most Democratic districts were underpopulated 
and almost all Republican district were overpopulated.109  In its 
decision the Supreme Court expressly recognized that “partisanship 
played some role” and that “the tendency of minority populations in 
Arizona . . . [was] to vote disproportionately for Democrats.”110  It 
nevertheless unanimously affirmed the decision below. 
The Supreme Court has observed: “Our . . . decisions have 
made clear that a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political 
gerrymandering, even if it so happens that the most loyal Democrats 
happen to be black Democrats and even if the State were conscious of 
that fact.”111  And as Harris demonstrates, partisan line drawing of 
districts (political gerrymandering) is a de facto byproduct of carrying 
out the purposes of the Voting Rights Act, sanctioned by the Supreme 
Court.112 
 
 
 
 
 
107 Id. at 1047.  
108 Id. at 1077. 
109 Id. at 1046. 
110 Harris, 136 S. Ct. at 1309. 
111 Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 551 (emphasis omitted). 
112 Id. at 551-52. 
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V. THE VARIOUS RESTRAINTS ON INCUMBENCY USED BY THE 
STATES113 
State legislatures drew new congressional districts in forty-two 
states and legislative districts in thirty-seven states.114  Since the 
legislature will obviously protect the seats of its own existing 
members, the districts drawn in those states undoubtedly will be 
designed for maximum partisan incumbency protection. 
A. Redistricting Commissions 
Arizona and California are the only states that have 
independent bodies that take the redistricting process wholly out of the 
hands of the legislature. 
The California Citizens Redistricting Commission115 is the 
redistricting organization for the state of California.  It is responsible 
for determining the boundaries for the Senate, Assembly, and Board of 
Equalization districts in the state.116  The fourteen-member 
commission consists of five Democrats, five Republicans, and four 
commissioners from neither major party.117  The commission was 
authorized following the passage of California Proposition 11,118 the 
Voters First Act, by voters in November 2008.  The commissioners 
were selected in November and December 2010 and were required to 
complete new maps by August 15, 2011.119 
Following the 2010 passage of California Proposition 20,120 the 
Voters First Act for Congress, the Commission was also assigned the 
responsibility of redrawing the state’s U.S. congressional district 
 
113 For a comprehensive overview of the many different governmental institutions that 
participate in effecting redistricting throughout the 50 states, see Brief for National Conference 
of State Legislatures as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Arizona State Legislature v. 
Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) (No. 13-1314) [hereinafter Brief 
for National Conference of State Legislatures].  See also Cain, Buffer, supra note 18. 
114 Who Draws the Lines?, LOY. L. SCH.: L.A., http://redistricting.lls.edu/who.php (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2017). 
115 What’s New, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/ 
(last visited Apr. 29, 2017). 
116 FAQ, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/ 
faq.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2017). 
117 Id.  
118 Id. 
119 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2 (amended 2010). 
120 Id. 
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boundaries necessitated by the 2010 United States Census. The 
Commission works as follows:  
The commission on appellate court appointees creates 
a pool of 25 nominees, ten from each of the two largest 
parties and five not from either of the two largest 
parties.  The highest ranking officer of the [H]ouse 
appoints one from the pool, then the minority leader of 
the [H]ouse appoints one, then the highest-ranking 
officer of the [S]enate appoints one, then the minority 
leader of the [S]enate appoints one.  These four appoint 
a fifth from the pool, not a member of any party already 
represented on the commission, as chair.  If the four 
deadlock, the commission on appellate court 
appointments appoints the chair.121 
Arizona’s Independent Redistricting Commission122 (AIRC) 
draws both congressional and legislative districts.  An amicus brief by 
the National Conference of State Legislatures in Arizona State 
Legislative v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission provides 
a good description of the AIRC: 
The AIRC originated in 2000, when Arizona’s voters 
approved Proposition 106, which amended the state 
constitution by ‘removing congressional redistricting 
authority from the Legislature and vesting that 
authority in the AIRC.’  The AIRC has five independent 
members.  The commissioners are selected from an 
original pool of twenty-five candidates.  The twenty-
five candidates must include ten from each of the two 
largest political parties in the state and five who are not 
registered with either party.  The candidates are 
selected not by the state legislature or any of its 
members; instead, they are selected by the Arizona state 
commission on appellate court appointments, which 
does not include any legislators among its members.  
Each of the four legislative leaders then chooses one 
 
121 Appendix F: Redistricting Commissions: Congressional Plans, SENATE MN, 
https://www.senate.mn/departments/scr/REDIST/Red2000/apfcomco.htm (last visited Apr. 
30, 2017). 
122 Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission: Mission, AZ.GOV, 
http://www.azredistricting.org/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2017). 
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commissioner from the pre-selected list of 25 
candidates. The four commissioners chosen by the 
legislative leaders then select the fifth commissioner, 
who may not be registered in the same party as any of 
the four commissioners.123   
In Arizona, the legislative leaders must pick from a pre-selected list of 
candidates, which effectively prevents the legislature from picking the 
commissioners of its choice.124   
The Republican-controlled Arizona Legislature brought a legal 
challenge against Arizona’s commission in 2012, arguing it was 
unconstitutional to strip lawmakers of a voice in redistricting.125  They 
relied on the Constitution’s elections clause, which says that the time, 
place, and manner in holding congressional elections “shall be 
prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof.”126  The Supreme 
Court’s four liberals, and Justice Anthony Kennedy, rejected that 
argument, saying the clause could not be read to preclude voter 
initiatives that seek an alternative way of redistricting.127 
In five other states (Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, New Jersey, and 
Washington) boards appointed by the legislatures (not from a 
predetermined list) draw the lines in place of the legislature.128  Since 
the legislature picks the members effectuating the final maps, these 
politician-appointed boards, which are not non-partisan, inevitably 
 
123 Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 113, at 15-17. 
124 Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 113, at 15-17. 
125 See Arizona, 135 S. Ct. at 2658-59; Amber Phillips, The Supreme Court’s Ruling in 
Favor of Redistricting Commissions, Explained, WASH. POST (June 29, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/06/29/the-supreme-courts-ruling-in-
favor-of-redistricting-commissions-explained/?utm_term=.eec7d95e9362. 
126 Arizona, 135 S. Ct. at 2658-59. 
127 In a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Supreme Court ruled the 
Constitution allowed Arizona voters to take line-drawing authority away from state lawmakers 
and give that to an independent commission. Id. at 2657.  In that 2000 ballot initiative, 
Arizonans “sought to restore ‘the core principle of republican government,’ namely, ‘that the 
voters should choose their representatives, not the other way around.’ “ Id. at 2677.  The four 
most conservative justices dissented, saying the Court ignored clear constitutional language 
that gives state legislatures power to draw district lines. Id. at 2678 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).  
For example, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in dissent, “[n]o matter how concerned we may 
be about partisanship in redistricting, this Court has no power to gerrymander the 
Constitution.” Id. at 2678 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting). 
128 Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 113, at 10. 
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produce districts desired by the legislators and incorporate incumbency 
protection districts.129 
 
129 See Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 113, at 10; Cain, 
Buffer, supra note 18, at 1820. 
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Four states (Iowa,130 New York,131 Ohio,132 and Maine133) have 
advisory commissions that advise the legislature through the 
mechanism of advisory reports or suggestions, or even propose maps, 
 
130 Iowa has a five-member advisory commission; however, if the legislature rejects the 
commission’s plan three times, the legislature is free to enact its own plan. See IOWA CODE 
ANN. §§ 42.3, 42.5 (West 2014). 
131 In 2011, New York good-government groups engaged in a vigorous effort to achieve 
non-partisan redistricting.  For example, NY Uprising was a nonpartisan coalition of good-
government groups founded by former New York City Mayor Ed Koch for the purpose of 
promoting independent nonpartisan redistricting in New York State in connection with the 
2011 redistricting cycle. NY Uprising, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/NY_Uprising 
(last visited Apr. 30, 2017).  Such article stated that “[d]uring the 2010 elections, NY Uprising 
sought pledges from candidates supporting independent redistricting . . . . Those who signed 
the pledge were referred to by NY Uprising as ‘Heroes of Reform,’ while those that did not 
were called ‘Enemies of Reform.’ “ Id.  Notwithstanding that 350 candidates, including those 
eventually elected to the legislature, signed the pledge, they did not succeed in effecting a 
totally nonpartisan redistricting commission. Id.Many of the same institutions and persons 
who were part of the NY Uprising movement were also part of a parallel movement called 
ReShape New York: “ReShape New York is a nonpartisan coalition of 30 good-government 
groups working for redistricting reform in New York.  Their goal is a fair and independent 
process to draw state legislature and congressional district maps.” ReShapeNY, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/ReShapeNY (last visited April 30, 2017).Instead, New York, by means 
of a legislatively-referred constitutional amendment, adopted an advisory commission which 
functioned as follows:  The commission includes ten members, eight of whom are “appointed 
by the four leaders of the state legislature.” See Brief for National Conference of State 
Legislatures, supra note 113, at 7.  Those eight “then appoint the final two members of the 
commission.” See Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 113, at 7.  If 
the legislature rejects the commission’s plan twice, the legislature is free to enact its own plan. 
See Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 113, at 8; N.Y. CONST. art. 
III, §§ 4, 5-b. 
132 Ohio has a six-member advisory commission, but the Ohio State Legislature draws 
congressional district boundaries.  Legislative boundaries are also drawn by a politically 
dominated commission comprising the following seven members: 
 1.  Governor 
 2.  State auditor 
 3.  Secretary of State 
 4.  One commissioner chosen by the speaker of the House in concert with his or her 
party’sleader in the Senate. 
   5.  One commissioner chosen by the House minority leader along with his party’s leader in        
the Senate. 
   6. “One person appointed by the president of the senate”; and 
   7. “One person appointed by the legislative leader of the largest political party in the senate     
of which the president of the senate is not a member.” 
See OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 103.51 (West 2014).  
Consequently, Ohio congressional lines and legislative lines are drawn by a partisan rather 
than by a non-partisan process. 
133 Maine has a commission comprising 15 members.  The legislature can override the 
commission’s plans and enact a plan, of its own, but only by a 2/3 vote. See ME. CONST. art. 
IV, pt. 3, § 1-A (West 2014); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 1206 (West 2014).  
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but the legislature retains ultimate power to set the contours of the new 
districts, enabling the legislature to protect incumbents. 
Finally, two states (Connecticut and Indiana) have backup 
commissions that prepare the redistricting only after a state legislature 
has failed to complete congressional redistricting on its own.  In 
Indiana, the backup commission prepares the congressional plan 
only;134 in Connecticut, the backup commission draws both the 
congressional and legislative plans.135 
Although political science Professor Cain favors independent 
commissions generally, he nevertheless notes that independent 
commissions, even those such as in California or Arizona, are not 
entirely free from partisan incumbency influence.136  He recommends 
incorporating the New Jersey bargaining system into the independent 
commission system because New Jersey has a tiebreaking member 
within its system.137  In New Jersey, the members of the commission 
for drawing congressional lines are appointed by the two majority and 
minority party leaders plus the two chairs of the state Democratic and 
Republican parties, each of whom get two selections.138  The thirteenth 
or tiebreaking member is chosen by the other twelve or by the state 
supreme court if the members cannot agree. 139 
B. Term Limits 
Term limits attack incumbents by limiting the number of terms 
a legislator can serve.140  It was a popular anti-incumbency weapon in 
the 1990s, but had no effect on Congress and limited effect on state 
legislatures.141 
1. Congress 
In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled that states cannot impose qualifications for prospective members 
 
134 IND. CODE ANN. § 3-3-2-2 (West 2014). 
135 CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6. 
136 Cain, Buffer, supra note 18, at 1832-33. 
137 Cain, Buffer, supra note 18, at 1808, 1838. 
138 Cain, Buffer, supra note 18, at 1838  
139 Cain, Buffer, supra note 18, at 1838. 
140 See The Term-Limited States, NCSL: NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 13, 
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/chart-of-term-limits-states.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Term-Limited States]. 
141 See Jim Argue, Jr., Term Limits: Panacea or Snake Oil?, 28 ARK. LAW. 47, 47-48.  See 
also Term-Limited States, supra note 150; Term Limits in the United States, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/ Term_limits_in_the_United_States (last visited Apr. 30, 2017). 
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of the U.S. Congress stricter than those specified in the Constitution.142  
The decision invalidated the Congressional term limit provisions of 
twenty-three states.143 
In Thornton, Amendment 73 to the Arkansas Constitution 
denied ballot access to any federal Congressional candidate having 
already served three terms in the U.S. House or two terms in the U.S. 
Senate.144  A member of the League of Women Voters sued in state 
court to have it invalidated.145  She alleged that the new restrictions 
amounted to an unwarranted expansion of the specific qualifications 
for membership in Congress enumerated in the U.S. Constitution.146  
Both the trial court and the Arkansas Supreme Court agreed, declaring 
Amendment 73 unconstitutional.147 
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed by a 5-4 vote.148  Writing for 
the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens held that: 
Finally, state-imposed restrictions, unlike the 
congressionally imposed restrictions at issue in Powell, 
violate a third idea central to this basic principle: that 
the right to choose representatives belongs not to the 
States, but to the people . . . . Following the adoption of 
the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, this ideal was 
extended to elections for the Senate.  The Congress of 
the United States, therefore, is not a confederation of 
nations in which separate sovereigns are represented by 
appointed delegates, but is instead a body composed of 
representatives of the people.149 
He further opined that sustaining Amendment 73 would result 
in “a patchwork of state qualifications” for U.S. Representatives, and 
described that consequence as inconsistent with “the uniformity and 
national character that the Framers . . . sought to ensure.”150  
 
142 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995). 
143 See Linda Greenhouse, High Court Blocks Term Limits for Congress in a 5-4 Decision, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/23/us/high-court-blocks-term-
limits-for-congress-in-a-5-4-decision.html?pagewanted=all. 
144 Thornton, 514 U.S. at 784. 
145 Id. at 784-85. 
146 Id. at 786. 
147 Id. at 783. 
148 Id. at 838. 
149 Thornton, 514 U.S. at 820-21.  
150 Id. at 822. 
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Concurring, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that the amendment 
would interfere with the “relationship between the people of the Nation 
and their National Government.” 151 
2. State Legislatures 
While U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton blocked term limits 
for Congress, there is no similar legal bar precluding the imposition of 
term limits on state legislatures.  The following fifteen state 
legislatures have term limits:152 
 
State Limited:  Terms (total years allowed) 
Arizona House:  4 terms (8 years) Senate:  4 terms (8 years) 
Arkansas House:  3 terms (6 years) Senate:  2 terms (8 years) 
California 12 year cumulative total for either or both houses. 
Colorado House:  4 terms (8 years) Senate:  2 terms (8 years) 
Florida House:  4 terms (8 years) Senate:  2 terms (8 years) 
 
Louisiana 
 
House:  3 terms (12 years) 
Senate:  3 terms (12 years) 
Maine House:  4 terms (8 years) Senate:  4 terms (8 years) 
 
151 Id. at 845 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (countering the 
majority opinion by stating: “[i]t is ironic that the Court bases today’s decision on the right of 
the people to ‘choose whom they please to govern them.’  Under our Constitution, there is 
only one State whose people have the right to ‘choose whom they please’ to represent 
Arkansas in Congress . . . . Nothing in the Constitution deprives the people of each State of 
the power to prescribe eligibility requirements for the candidates who seek to represent them 
in Congress.  The Constitution is simply silent on this question.  And where the Constitution 
is silent, it raises no bar to action by the States or the people.”) (internal citations omitted). 
152 State Legislative Term Limits, U.S. TERM LIMITS, http://termlimits.org/term-limits/state-
term-limits/state-legislative-term-limits/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2017). 
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State Limited:  Terms (total years allowed) 
Michigan House:  3 terms (6 years) Senate:  2 terms (8 years) 
Missouri House:  4 terms (8 years) Senate:  2 terms (8 years) 
Montana House:  4 terms (8 years) Senate:  2 terms (8 years) 
Nebraska Unicameral:  2 terms (8 years) 
Nevada Assembly:  6 terms (12 years) Senate:       3 terms (12 years) 
Ohio House:  4 terms (8 years) Senate:  2 terms (8 years) 
Oklahoma 12 year combined total for both houses 
South Dakota House:  4 terms (8 years) Senate:  2 terms (8 years) 
 
Professor Robert Kurfirst explores the reasoning behind 
proposals for term limits and concludes that although “all supporters 
believe that high legislative incumbency rates are unacceptable,” they 
do not share similar motivations.153  Kurfirst divides the prevailing 
theories into four groups: “Progressives,” “Populists,” “Republicans,” 
and “Libertarians.”154 
Progressives value professionalism in politics.  By eliminating 
“seniority” and candidates’ reliance “upon securing the financial 
resources necessary for reelection,”155 term limits act as an 
immunization from corruption. 
Populists value “responsive and efficient legislatures” above 
all.156  As such, populists encourage an “influx of ordinary citizens” in 
order to infuse legislatures with “fresh perspectives and uncalloused 
outlooks . . . .”157 
 
153 Kurfirst, supra note 8, at 119.  
154 Kurfirst, supra note 8, at 119. 
155 Kurfirst, supra note 8, at 123. 
156 Kurfirst, supra note 8, at 123. 
157 Kurfirst, supra note 8, at 124. 
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Republicanism within term-limit logic views “political 
distance” as necessary to both allow for the functioning of the 
“deliberate process” and preserve the “government’s authority.”158 
Libertarians see two benefits of term-limits: “they would 
eliminate both the votes and the leadership influence of the most pro-
spending members.”159 
Professor Edward J. Lopez, BB&T Distinguished Professor of 
Capitalism at Western Carolina University, articulates two reasons for 
term limits.160  First, higher tenure buttresses a legislature’s inefficient 
big government (high spending).161  Second, higher tenure creates 
inefficient (anti-competitive) conditions in the legislative election 
market.162 
Associate Professor at University of California, San Francisco, 
D.E. Apollonio and Assistant Professor of Political Science University 
of Massachusetts, Amherst, Raymond J. La Raja opt for a more 
quantitative than theoretical analysis of the effects of term limits on 
legislatures.163  Apollonio and La Raja use a cross-state comparison of 
the power of legislators before and after term limits were imposed.164  
Their analysis found that term limits were able to decrease power in 
state legislatures by both decreasing average financial contributions to 
legislators and reducing the power of caucus leaders relative to other 
party members.165  However, these changes are more apparent in the 
lower chambers than in the upper chambers.166 
Professor H. Abbie Erler, Associate Professor of Political 
Science, Kenyon College, details some of the reasons favoring term 
limits advanced by various academicians.167  Professor Erler states, for 
one thing:  
 
158 Kurfirst, supra note 8, at 125. 
159 Kurfirst, supra note 8, at 126. 
160 See Edward J. Lopez, Term Limits: Causes and Consequences, 114 PUB. 
CHOICE 1, 1 (2003). 
161 Id. at 1. 
162 Id. at 1, 47 (acknowledging the need for further research to determine the 
veracity of pro-term limits advocacy). 
163 See D. E. Appollonio & Raymond J. La Raja, Term Limits, Campaign 
Contributions, and the Distribution of Power in State Legislatures, 31 LEGIS. STUD. 
Q. 259 (2006). 
164 Id. at 259. 
165 Id. at 267. 
166 Id. at 274. 
167 See H. Abbie Erler, Legislative Term Limits and State Spending, 133 PUB. 
CHOICE 479 (2007). 
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[T]erm limits will remedy the problem of adverse 
selection by facilitating the election of citizen-
legislators.  Supporters of term limits see citizen-
legislators as the antithesis of the professionalized 
politicians who have come to dominate state 
legislatures.  Unlike their professionalized peers, 
citizen-legislators have no desire to make careers out of 
service in the government.168 
Further Professor Erler went on to state that “term limits will 
put an end to the ‘culture of spending’ that pervades state legislatures.  
According to this view, legislators do not necessarily enter office with 
pro-spending preferences but, over time, develop these preferences as 
they become immersed in the process of governing.”169 
Einer R. Elhauge, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, 
similarly lauded the merits of term limits.170  He disagreed with those 
who argued that term limits “seemed to have no redeeming 
prodemocratic virtue; if most voters wanted to replace experienced 
incumbents with newcomers, they could do so without term limits.  
Just vote the bums out.”171  Professor Elhauge concluded: 
There are compelling reasons to believe term limits 
help the electorate register its political preferences 
more accurately.  Term limits reduce collective action 
pressures to vote for a senior incumbent to gain a higher 
share of legislative clout.  And term limits lower entry 
barriers that keep out challengers.  Both effects would 
likely reduce the ideological divergence between 
electorates and their representatives.172 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding that partisan gerrymandering is both 
politically unfair and governmentally distasteful to many, elimination 
of the partisan gerrymandering phenomenon seems improbable.  
 
168 Id. at 480. 
169 Id. at 480-81. 
170 See Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, U. CHI. L. REV. 83,85 
(1997). 
171 Id. at 85. 
172 Elhauge, supra note 180, at 193 (emphasis added). 
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Undoubtedly, the primary reason for the failure to reform the 
districting process can be understood as resulting from the fact that the 
real voters and not academicians, legal scholars, newspapers and good 
government groups, generally like their representatives and do not 
wish to dispense with them. 
In 2011, LATFOR conducted more than a dozen public 
hearings in different geographic locations in the State of New York for 
the purpose of soliciting the public’s view in respect of any proposed 
2012 redistricting plans.173  The author, who was redistricting counsel 
for the New York State Assembly at that time, attended those public 
hearings and spoke with witnesses who, even after publicly excoriating 
partisan gerrymandering, urged that their congressional districts be 
drawn in a manner that kept the same voters in the new districts. 
With respect to restraints on incumbency there appears to be a 
clear disconnect between theoretical distaste for incumbency 
protection and the continued popularity of keeping incumbents in 
power when actual, real elections are impacted.174  In such cases, there 
is a NIMBY (not in my backyard) phenomenon operating.  Voters want 
term limits or non-partisan redistricting so long as it does not hurt the 
ability of their representative to be re-elected.175  In other words, term 
limits and/or nonpartisan redistricting are good in theory, but not in 
practice. 
 
 
173 See Transcripts, N.Y. LEGIS. TASK FORCE ON DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH & 
REAPPORTIONMENT, http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/transcripts/ (last visited Apr. 30, 
2017). 
174 Persily, supra note 21, at 670 (arguing that voters’ connections with their own 
representatives, not gerrymandering, are the principal reasons incumbents get re-
elected). 
175 Kong-Pin Chen & Emerson M.S. Niou, Term Limits as a Response to 
Incumbency Advantage, 67 J. POL. 390 (2005) (noting the paradox that supports 
this dichotomy, namely voters choose to re-elect their incumbents while 
simultaneously supporting term limits). 
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